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ABSTRACT
Many previous experiments have found that, consistent with myopic loss aversion, subjects invest
more in risky assets if they are given less frequent feedback about their returns, are shown their aggregated
portfolio-level (rather than separate asset-by-asset) returns, or are shown long-horizon (rather than
one-year) historical asset class return distributions. We study the implications of these results for the
effect of financial institutions’ returns disclosure policy on risk-taking. We find that aggregated returns
disclosure treatments do not increase portfolio allocations to equity in an experiment where—in contrast
to previous experiments—subjects invest in real mutual funds over the course of one year.
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A remarkable series of experiments has found that subjects are more willing to invest in 
risky assets with positive expected returns if only aggregated returns are reported to them, rather 
than the individual component returns. Information aggregation along various dimensions 
produces this effect: reporting subjects’ portfolio return over the last n > 1 periods rather than 
reporting single-period returns each period (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997; 
Barron and Erev, 2003; Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters, 2003; Bellemare et al., 2005; Haigh and 
List, 2006; Sutter, 2007; Langer and Weber, 2008; Fellner and Sutter, 2009; van der Heijden et 
al., 2011), reporting subjects’ portfolio-level returns rather than returns for each individual asset 
separately (Anagol and Gamble, 2009), or reporting historical long-horizon return distributions 
of asset classes rather than historical one-year return distributions of asset classes (Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1999).
1 
These results are consistent with subjects suffering from myopic loss aversion (Benartzi 
and Thaler, 1995), which is the combination of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and 
mental accounting (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1985, 1990, 1999).
2 Aggregation 
frames encourage subjects to integrate multiple gamble outcomes into a single mental account. If 
these gambles are not perfectly correlated across time (or across assets) and the gambles have 
positive expected values, the resulting integration can lower the probability that the mental 
account is evaluated as having borne an overall loss.
3 Thus, integration makes the gambles 
appear more attractive to a loss-averse subject than if each gamble occupied its own separate 
mental account. 
The strength and consistency of the experimental results constitute compelling evidence 
that myopic loss aversion is a real psychological phenomenon that responds to aggregation 
manipulations. In this paper, we consider a related but separate question: Would a financial 
institution increase the portfolio risk-taking of its clients if it started disclosing returns at a more 
aggregated level, and decrease risk-taking if it started disclosing returns at a less aggregated 
                                                 
1 Guiso (2009) examines another aggregation manipulation that we do not test in this paper. He finds that asking 
subjects about their labor income risk before offering a hypothetical lottery makes them more likely to accept the 
lottery. 
2 Loss-averse agents derive utility and disutility directly from gains and losses, and the disutility of a loss is greater 
than the utility of a gain of equivalent magnitude. Agents engage in mental accounting when they evaluate outcomes 
within a subset of their wealth portfolio—the “mental account”—in isolation from outcomes outside the mental 
account. 
3 Aggregating gambles does not decrease the probability of an overall loss for all return distributions. But the loss 
probability does decrease, for example, when the aggregated gambles are drawn from the same normal distribution. 3 
level? 
Numerous authors have extrapolated from the existing experimental literature to suggest 
that the answer to this question is “yes.” For example, Thaler et al. (1997) write, “Decisions 
made by employees covered by such [defined contribution pension] plans may vary considerably 
depending on how their investment opportunities are described and the manner and frequency 
with which they receive feedback on their returns.” Gneezy and Potters (1997) observe that, 
“Manipulating the evaluation period of prospective clients could be a useful marketing strategy 
for fund managers.” Haigh and List (2005) write that “institutions may have the ability to 
influence asset prices through changes in their information provisioning policies.” 
However, the typical investment environment has a number of features that may diminish 
the impact of disclosure policy on portfolio risk-taking, and previous experiments, which were 
not designed to address disclosure policy, abstracted away from these features: 
1.  Previous experimenters have had their subjects’ undivided attention, along with complete 
control over information flows during the experiment, whereas aggregation 
manipulations by a single institution in a typical investment environment may have little 
power because of limited attention and interference from or interactions with background 
information flows. 
2.  The experiments to date have been conducted over the course of one session, but the 
psychology of risk-taking over many days, months, or years may differ. For example, 
being shown returns more frequently may not shorten investors’ evaluation periods in 
settings where natural evaluation periods such as a year or a quarter already exist. 
3.  Previous experiments have used laboratory assets that were not given labels such as 
“stocks” and “bonds.” When dealing with familiar assets such as stocks, bonds, and 
mutual funds, investors may have strong prior beliefs about what they should do. For 
example, they may employ context-specific heuristics such as, “Allocate 100 minus my 
age to stocks,” which could blunt the effect of aggregation manipulations on portfolio 
choices. 
 
We conducted an experiment that incorporates these features of the typical investment 
environment that may be relevant for gauging the effect of disclosure policy. We recruited 597 
subjects from the general U.S. adult population to participate in a year-long study. Each subject 4 
allocated $325 among four real mutual funds that cover the U.S. equity, international equity, 
U.S. bond, and U.S. money market asset classes. Subjects were free to reallocate their portfolio 
throughout the year, just as if they were making real investments in these mutual funds. We paid 
each subject whatever the $325 would have been worth at the end of the year if the money had 
been invested according to his or her choices. The large per-subject payment ensured that 
subjects remained interested in their experimental portfolio through the end of a one-year 
experiment. 
We test four aggregation manipulations, which we randomly assigned to subjects.  
The first manipulation varied how frequently subjects saw their returns by paying half of 
subjects to view their weekly returns once a week and paying the other half to view their 
biannual returns once every six months. 
The second manipulation varied the level of detail subjects saw when they viewed their 
weekly or biannual returns. Half of subjects saw only their overall portfolio return over the last 
week or six months. The other half of subjects saw the return over the last week or six months of 
each individual asset they were holding. Because a screen available to all subjects showed the 
dollar value of each asset in their portfolio, subjects in the former group could, in theory, 
calculate their individual asset returns if they remembered the previous value of each asset. But 
we did not ourselves provide convenient access to these previous values, hindering this 
calculation. Similarly, subjects in the latter group could calculate their overall portfolio return 
from their individual asset returns, but we did not perform this calculation for them. 
The third manipulation varied the historical returns information shown to subjects. We 
showed some subjects graphs depicting the distribution of real one-year returns for U.S. equities, 
international equities, U.S. bonds, and U.S. money markets from 1971 to 2007. Others were 
shown the distributions of real annualized five-year returns for the four asset classes over the 
same time period. We also gave some subjects no historical returns information at all in order to 
see whether allocations were affected by seeing any version of the returns graphs. 
The fourth manipulation varied whether subjects who saw the historical returns graphs 
could also access information about the historical performance of mixed portfolios. Specifically, 
some subjects could only see historical return distributions of four “pure” portfolios, each 
invested 100% in one of the four asset classes offered. Other subjects could, via a Web interface, 
see return distributions of portfolios invested in whatever mix of asset classes they wished. The 5 
latter graphs might make more apparent the diversification benefits of holding multiple asset 
classes, thus encouraging greater investment in risky assets. 
We find that none of the aggregation manipulations caused a significant increase in 
portfolio risk-taking. Seeing ongoing portfolio returns less frequently, seeing five-year instead of 
one-year historical return distributions, and having the ability to see historical returns of mixed 
portfolios do not affect the portfolio fraction allocated to equities. Seeing ongoing portfolio-level 
returns instead of ongoing asset-by-asset returns decreases equity allocations initially—the 
opposite of Anagol and Gamble’s (2009) result. This significant decrease, along with the 
significant difference between how likely subjects in the weekly versus biannual return viewing 
treatments were to report in an exit questionnaire that study participation made them see market 
returns more often, indicates that our failure to find a positive link between return aggregation 
and risk-taking is not due to our aggregation manipulations having no effect on the information 
subjects received. 
We identify subjects who are particularly loss averse and prone to mental accounting by 
offering subjects a one-time gamble. This gamble gave them an equal chance of adding $8 to or 
subtracting $5 from their up-front participation payment. Forty-seven percent of subjects rejected 
this gamble. Rabin (2000) and Barberis, Huang, and Thaler (2006) show that rejections of such 
small positive expected value gambles are difficult to explain without loss aversion and mental 
accounting. However, even within this subset of particularly myopically loss-averse subjects, 
aggregation does not significantly increase equity allocations. 
We also find that relative to when no historical asset class return information is shown, 
subjects initially invest 11 to 12 percentage points more in equities when they see either one-year 
or five-year asset class return distributions. This suggests that many individual investors are 
unaware of how high historical equity returns have been relative to their variance. The effect of 
seeing historical return distributions is especially large among subjects who do not have a 
bachelor’s degree. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our experimental 
procedure. Section II presents the empirical results. Section III concludes. 
 6 
I. Experimental procedure 
A. Subject recruitment 
  We recruited subjects in late June and early July 2008 for a one-year investing 
experiment through the market research firm MarketTools. Figure 1 shows the number of 
subjects active in the experiment at each calendar date (the gray bars), as well as the level of the 
S&P 500 normalized by its July 2, 2007 value (the solid line). The S&P 500 was down only 18% 
from its October 2007 peak at the end of June 2008 when subject recruitment began; the 
market’s precipitous fall did not commence until after the September 2008 bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers. Even though our experiment spanned the market collapse in the fall of 2008, 
all of our subjects’ initial portfolio choices were made before it was known that we were in a 
bear market of historic proportions. We will discuss in Section II.C evidence that the market’s 
decline prior to the experiment does not explain our null treatment effects. 
We requested that our subjects be at least 25 years old and have an annual income of at 
least $35,000, so that it was more likely that they had some investable assets. All interaction with 
the subjects occurred through the Internet; we had no direct contact with them. 
  The initial invitation text introduced the faculty authors with our university affiliations in 
order to establish the credibility of the study. It then informed subjects that they would receive a 
$20 up-front participation fee for allocating $325 among four mutual funds. At the end of one 
year, we would pay them whatever their initial $325 portfolio was worth at that time, plus an 
additional amount for periodically checking their portfolio’s return on the study website. The text 
concluded by telling the subjects that we expected the initial portfolio allocation to take thirty 
minutes to an hour, and that it would take no more than thirty minutes to an hour of additional 
time over the course of the next year to check their portfolio’s return. 
  People interested in participating in the study clicked a link that took them to an informed 
consent page which described the task, the compensation scheme, and the expected time 
commitment again. The informed consent document also told subjects that they would 
periodically receive e-mails with a link that they could click to see their portfolio’s return, and 
that we would pay them for clicking on these links. 
  Giving informed consent took subjects to a registration page where they supplied their 
name and contact information and chose a password. In order to prevent anybody from 
registering for the study more than once, we blocked any attempts to register multiple times from 7 
the same IP address. Upon registration, an e-mail was sent to each subject with a link to click on 
in order to activate his or her account.
4 The link then took them to a login screen. 
We recruited 600 subjects, but three of them did not participate after registering. 
Therefore, our final sample consists of 597 subjects, whom we randomly assigned to one of 
eighteen experimental cells. Table 1 shows the distribution of our sample among the 
experimental cells. Table 2 groups the experimental cells in a different way to make clearer the 
comparisons we will be making in our analysis and the sample that is available for these 
comparisons. We will describe each experimental condition in further detail in Sections I.C and 
I.F. 
 
B. Opening instructions screen 
  After logging in, subjects received a fuller description of the study instructions. Figure 2 
shows the screen that subjects in one of our experimental cells saw when they logged in for the 
first time. Subjects in other cells saw variations of this screen. The instructions reiterated the 
nature of the portfolio allocation task and the compensation scheme, and informed subjects that 
they could reallocate their portfolio any time during the year by logging into their account on the 
website. Subjects were also told about the inducement to view their ongoing returns, as well as 
the content and frequency of the ongoing returns they would be paid to see. In some conditions, 
subjects were introduced to the historical returns graphing tool. 
 
C. Historical returns graph treatments 
  For 80% of our subjects, the bottom of the initial experimental screen (such as the one 
shown in Figure 2) introduced a graphing tool that was intended to help them understand the 
historical real return distributions of four asset classes: U.S. equities, international equities, U.S. 
bonds, and U.S. money markets. The remaining 20% of subjects did not see the graphing tool 
and did not receive any alternative information on historical returns. The graphs generated by the 
tool are modeled after those in Benartzi and Thaler (1999). Returns for an asset class during the 
historical sample period are sorted from lowest to highest and displayed as a bar chart. The 
lowest return is the leftmost bar, and the highest return is the rightmost bar. The median return is 
                                                 
4 Using an e-mailed activation link ensured that we had an active e-mail account to which we could send the returns-
checking links. 8 
also highlighted and labeled with its value.
5 We used the S&P 500, MSCI EAFE, Lehman 
Brothers U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, and 30-day U.S. Treasury bill as our asset class proxies. 
Because the MSCI EAFE series starts in 1970, we cannot use returns prior to 1970 while 
maintaining identical sample periods for all asset classes. The most recent year of returns 
available at the start of the experiment was 2007. In order for each return series to have a unique 
median, we used the period from 1971 to 2007—which has an odd number of years—for all our 
asset classes.
6 Subjects who had the graphing tool available to them were required to click 
through an animation that explained how to interpret and use the graph before they could 
proceed to the next part of the study. This animation could also be replayed in later screens 
where the graphing tool was shown. 
The graphs varied across treatments along two dimensions. The first dimension was 
whether one-year return distributions or five-year annualized return distributions were shown. 
We used overlapping periods for the five-year distributions, so there were 33 bars shown on the 
five-year graph. The second dimension was whether subjects could see only the historical return 
distributions of four “pure” portfolios—each of which is invested 100% in a single asset class—
or could see the return distribution of any asset class mix they wanted. Figure 3 shows an 
example of a graph where one-year returns are being shown and only four pure portfolio 
distributions are accessible. Figure 4 shows an example of a graph where five-year returns are 
being shown and any portfolio’s return distribution can be seen. These two figures also 
demonstrate how the graphing tool allowed subjects to compare the return distributions of two 
different portfolios side-by-side. 
 
D. Initial portfolio allocation 
Subjects made their asset allocations by specifying portfolio percentages to be invested in 
each investment option. For the 80% of subjects who had access to the graphing tool, this choice 
                                                 
5 A programming error caused the bar immediately to the left of the median return to be highlighted instead for the 
first six months of the experiment, even though the correct median return number was displayed in the graph’s 
caption. The paper’s figures show the graphs with the shifted highlighting. The discrepancy was not visually 
apparent except in the one-year U.S. equities graph, where the median return was 10.61% but the highlighted bar 
corresponded to a 7.38% return. 
6 In addition, the Lehman Brothers index starts in 1976. We construct our own aggregate bond market index returns 
from 1971 to 1975 by weighting the returns of Ibbotson’s long-term corporate bond, intermediate Treasury, and 
long-term Treasury indexes by the total amount of each type of issue outstanding (as reported by the U.S. Treasury) 
at the end of the prior year. 9 
was made after they saw the initial instructions screen and clicked through the animated 
explanation of the graphing tool. For the 20% of our subjects who did not see any historical 
returns graphs, the input boxes for the initial portfolio allocation were below the experimental 
instructions on the first screen. 
Subjects could choose among four index funds offered by Northern Funds: the U.S. Stock 
Index Fund, the International Equity Index Fund, the Bond Index Fund, and the Money Market 
Fund.
7 We provided links to each fund’s prospectus. We also informed subjects that the 
International Equity Index Fund charges a 2% redemption fee on the sale of shares held for less 
than thirty days.
8 For subjects who were shown the historical returns graphs, the graphing tool 
remained accessible on the same screen in which the portfolio allocation was entered in order to 
aid their portfolio decision. Figure 5 shows this screen for one of our experimental conditions. 
Subjects could take as long as they wanted to make their portfolio decision. We did not (and 
could not) prevent subjects from consulting sources of information available outside of our 
website. 
 
E. Post-allocation questionnaire 
  After subjects submitted their initial allocation, they completed a post-allocation 
questionnaire that elicited information on demographics, self-assessed investment knowledge, 
self-assessed confidence about their portfolio allocation, and time preference. As noted earlier, 
we also offered subjects a gamble with a 50% chance of winning $8 and a 50% chance of losing 
$5. The outcome of the gamble depended on whether the high temperature at San Francisco 
Airport on a future date, as reported on the National Weather Service website, was an odd or 
even integer. We applied the gains and losses from this gamble to the $20 participation fee. 
Expected utility maximizers with remotely reasonable risk aversion over large-stakes gambles 
should always accept such a small-stakes, positive-expected-value gamble (Rabin, 2000; 
Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2006). Therefore, subjects who refuse the gamble are particularly 
likely to be loss averse and prone to engage in mental accounting. Fehr and Goette (2007) show 
that in a field experiment on labor supply, only workers who rejected a similar gamble (50% 
                                                 
7 We chose Northern Funds because it was the largest fund family that offered U.S. equity index funds, international 
equity index funds, bond index funds, and a money market fund; did not charge sales loads; did not impose 
redemption fees on non-international funds; and did not impose frequent trading restrictions. 
8 We follow a first-in-first-out (FIFO) convention for determining which shares will incur the redemption fee, as 
real-life mutual funds do. 10 
chance of winning 8 Swiss francs and 50% chance of losing 5 Swiss francs) exhibited a negative 
elasticity of effort per hour with respect to an exogenous increase in the piece wage rate, 
consistent with their daily labor supply being determined by loss-averse preferences that are 
evaluated each day with a reference point around a target daily income level. 
Upon finishing the questionnaire, subjects were taken to a page that showed their current 
investment allocation and total balance (see Figure 6). At this point, subjects could log out. On 
subsequent logins to the site that were not initiated by clicking an e-mailed link (the e-mails are 
described in Section I.F), subjects would see this portfolio status page first. 
 
F. Ongoing returns viewing treatments 
During the one-year duration of the experiment, half of subjects received e-mails once a 
week with a link they could click to view their previous week’s return. These e-mails were sent 
on Saturdays, starting at the end of the subject’s first full calendar week of participation. If they 
clicked the link within a week of receiving the e-mail, we added $1 to their final payment. Thus, 
if they clicked all of the e-mailed links they received during the one-year study, they would earn 
an additional $52. The other half of subjects received e-mails once every 26 weeks with a link 
they could click to view their prior six-month return. The dates these biannual e-mails were sent 
coincided with when these subjects would have otherwise received their 26th and 52nd e-mails if 
they had been assigned to receive weekly e-mails. If subjects receiving biannual e-mails clicked 
the link within a week of receiving the e-mail, we added $20 to their final payment.
9 We offered 
only $20 per viewing for this group because we anticipated that subjects receiving weekly 
e-mails would not click on every e-mailed link, and we wanted to equalize average return-
viewing payments across treatments based on our best guess of treatment compliance. 
  Within each of the above two treatments, we varied the level of detail subjects saw when 
they clicked on the e-mailed link. Half of subjects saw a screen like that in Figure 7, which 
showed the return of each individual asset they held. The other half of subjects saw a screen like 
that in Figure 8, which showed only the overall return of their portfolio.
10 These return screens 
                                                 
9 If an e-mail was sent on day t, the link reported returns through day t, even if the link was not clicked until day t + 
n.  
10 When ongoing returns were reported asset by asset, if the e-mail was sent on day t, only assets held on day t were 
included in the returns list. Returns on assets completely liquidated prior to day t were not reported. If a subject 
previously held no position in an asset but established a position sometime between e-mail send dates, the asset 11 
were only accessible via the e-mailed link (i.e., they could not be reached by following links 
within the study website). If a link in a given e-mail had already been clicked, clicking it again 
later would not lead to the return screen; this was to ensure that subjects receiving biannual 
e-mails did not see the returns screen more frequently that once every six months. 
 
G. Treatment of interest, dividends, and trades 
Dividends and interest were automatically reinvested in the fund that paid them.
11 All 
subjects were free to reallocate their portfolio at any time during the year by logging into their 
account and clicking a button on the portfolio status page that took them to a reallocation screen. 
The reallocation screen (see Figure 9) showed the graphing tool relevant for the subject’s 
experimental condition,
12 links to prospectuses, the current percentage allocations across the four 
mutual funds, and a note about the international fund’s redemption fee. Four input boxes allowed 
subjects to specify what their new portfolio allocation should be. Trades were executed at the 
next close of the U.S. markets and could be cancelled by the subject any time up to then. 
 
H. Exit questionnaire 
At the end of the one-year investment period, we administered an exit questionnaire to 
subjects. We will use in our analysis the questions that elicited objective measures of financial 
literacy, beliefs about stock market return autocorrelations, and the effect study participation had 
on subjects’ attention to market fluctuations. Of the 597 subjects, 569 (95%) completed the exit 
questionnaire. 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
return reported was for the full period between e-mails (one week or six months) and did not adjust for the fact that 
the asset was held for only part of the time between e-mails. 
11 We used Yahoo! Finance for our dividend and price data. On July 1, 2008, Yahoo! erroneously reported a money 
market fund dividend of 28.8 cents per dollar invested, which was deposited into 339 of our subjects’ accounts. The 
mean excess windfall was 4.5% of portfolio value. After the market close on July 31, 2008, we sent an e-mail to the 
affected subjects informing them of the error and (if applicable) how it had affected the July 5 weekly return 
reported to them. We let them keep the windfall but reallocated it (at the same time the e-mail was sent) in 
accordance with the subjects’ initially chosen asset allocation. This reallocation raised average equity allocations by 
1.0 percentage points among subjects receiving weekly e-mails and 2.2 percentage points among subjects receiving 
biannual e-mails. 
12 The graphs shown to a given subject remained constant throughout the experimental period. That is, they were not 
updated in real time to reflect new returns that had been realized since the start of the experiment. 12 
II. Empirical results 
A. Subject characteristics 
Table 3 displays demographic and financial summary statistics on our subjects, which 
were collected in the questionnaire administered immediately after the initial portfolio allocation. 
Men slightly outnumber women, and the young are slightly overrepresented in our sample—33% 
of subjects are 35 or younger—although all ages have substantial representation. Our subjects are 
relatively well-educated, with 56% reporting holding a bachelor’s degree or higher. The high 
average level of education is perhaps due to our request for subjects with annual incomes above 
$35,000; only 5% of subjects report an income less than that threshold, and the median subject 
reports an income between $50,001 and $75,000. The median subject reports total bank, 
brokerage, and retirement account assets of about $75,000, and 29% of our sample reports assets 
in excess of $100,000. Only 20% of our sample reports holding no stocks whatsoever in their 
personal portfolio. 
Table 4 shows measures of our subjects’ financial literacy. The subjects’ self-assessments 
were collected in the post-allocation questionnaire at the beginning of the experiment, and the 
measures of objective knowledge were collected in the exit questionnaire administered at the end 
of the one-year experimental period. The median subject considers himself a “somewhat 
knowledgeable” investor, “somewhat confident” that the portfolio decision was right for him, 
and “somewhat likely” to change his portfolio decision if he consulted a professional investment 
advisor. However, relative to the typical American, the subjects are very knowledgeable about 
basic financial concepts. Around 90% of subjects understand that $100 in a savings account 
yielding 2% interest per year would be worth more than $102 at the end of five years, that a 
stock mutual fund is safer than a single company’s stock, and that stock returns fluctuate more 
than bond and savings account returns. In contrast, Lusardi and Mitchell (2009) report that 
American Life Panel respondents, who are drawn from a nationwide adult population, correctly 
answered the compound interest question only 69% of the time, the diversification question only 
71% of the time, and the return fluctuation question 88% of the time. It is possible that our 
subjects were able to answer these questions well at the end of the experimental period because 
of what they learned by participating in our experiment, although this seems unlikely. 
With regards to market return serial correlation, 55% of subjects believe that a 10% rise 
in the market in one month should not change their prediction of the subsequent month’s return. 13 
Similarly, 55% believe that a 10% fall in the market in one month tells them nothing about the 
subsequent month’s return. Among those who do not believe that the market follows a random 
walk, those who believe in positive serial correlation outnumber those who believe in negative 
serial correlation by a factor of three. 
Since the experimental setup was simple (from the perspective of an individual subject) 
and the assets were passively managed funds in familiar asset classes, subjects did not 
necessarily need a long time to make a considered decision. The median subject who received no 
historical returns information took 14 minutes between login and submission of the initial 
portfolio allocation, as did the median subject who was only given the historical returns 
distributions of portfolios invested 100% in a single asset class. The median subject who was 
able to see the historical returns distribution of any portfolio mix took 13 minutes.
13 
 
B. Average asset allocations 
  The average portfolio percentages subjects held in each asset class at the beginning of the 
experiment, halfway through their investment period, and at the end of their investment period 
are found in Table 5. For subjects who received weekly e-mails, portfolio shares at the halfway 
point are measured eight days after they receive their 26th e-mailed returns-checking link. For 
subjects who received biannual e-mails, portfolio shares at the halfway point are measured eight 
days after they receive their first returns-checking link.
14 
Subjects initially allocated 65.7% of their portfolio to equities—with 34.8% invested in 
international equities and 30.9% invested in domestic equities—18.6% to bonds, and 15.8% to 
money markets.
15 Subjects initially held positive amounts in 3.66 asset classes out of 4, on 
average. The average portfolio share invested in equities fell to 57.2% at the midpoint of the 
investment period, reflecting steeply dropping stock prices, and then recovered along with the 
stock market to 59.4% by the end of the investment period.  
                                                 
13 We report medians because of outliers for whom the time between initial login and initial portfolio submission 
was extremely long. These subjects likely made their allocation over the course of more than one sitting. 
14 By measuring allocations at this later point, we capture the allocations of subjects receiving both weekly and 
biannual e-mails right after they have been induced to see their returns on the website via an e-mailed link. It may be 
particularly convenient to reallocate one’s experimental portfolio right after clicking on the e-mailed link. Therefore, 
biannual subjects have had a chance to adjust their portfolios in response to market movements and the reporting 
regime via the same convenient channel weekly subjects had had available each week for the prior six months. 
15 The relatively high allocation to international equities may have been due to this asset class’s strong performance 
in the time immediately preceding the experiment. The most recent one-year before-tax return reported in the fund 
prospectus was 25.76% for the international index fund, versus only 15.56% for the domestic equity index fund.  14 
 
C. Effect of ongoing return presentation on equity shares 
  Table 6 shows that our periodic e-mails to subjects were successful at creating significant 
variation in the frequency with which they visited the study website and viewed their returns. 
During the one-year investment period, subjects who received weekly e-mails logged into the 
website 60.7 times on average, versus only 18.2 times for subjects who received biannual 
e-mails. Under the weekly e-mail treatment, 45.3 of those 60.7 logins occurred because subjects 
clicked on an e-mailed link to view the screen with their ongoing returns. Thus, compliance with 
the link-clicking requests was high; 87.2% of weekly links sent were clicked within a week of 
receipt. In the biannual e-mail treatment, subjects clicked 73.8% of links sent, so they saw the 
returns screen an average of 1.5 times. Subjects in both treatments logged in about 16 times on 
average when not prompted by an e-mail. 
  The extra return viewings by subjects who received weekly e-mails did not merely crowd 
out or coincide with return viewing that they would have engaged in anyway. In the exit 
questionnaire, we asked subjects, “Did participating in this study make you see the ups and 
downs of the market more often than you otherwise would have?” Subjects could respond that 
participation made them see the fluctuations “more often,” “less often,” or that it had “no effect.” 
In the weekly e-mail treatment, 79% of subjects reported that participation made them see the 
ups and downs of the market more often, versus 57% of subjects in the biannual e-mail 
treatment. Because these responses do not indicate how much more often study participation 
made them see returns, this 22% gap (p < 0.01) likely understates the effect being in the weekly 
treatment had on return viewing relative to being in the biannual treatment. Only 1% of subjects 
in the weekly e-mail treatment and 2% of subjects in the biannual e-mail treatment reported that 
the study caused them to see market fluctuations less often. 
  In Table 7, we analyze the impact of the ongoing return presentation treatments on the 
total fraction of the portfolio invested in equities. The table reports coefficients from OLS 
regressions where the dependent variable is the total fraction of the portfolio invested in equities 
at the beginning of the experiment, halfway through the subject’s investment period, or at the 
end of the subject’s investment period. All regressions control for a dummy for being sent 
biannual (instead of weekly) e-mails and a dummy for being shown ongoing portfolio-level 
(instead of asset-by-asset) returns. 15 
We look first at the equity share of subjects’ initial allocations (column 1). We find that 
being sent biannual rather than weekly e-mails raises the initial allocation to equities by only 0.6 
percentage points, an increase not significantly different from zero. The point estimate is two 
orders of magnitude smaller than the 28.7 percentage point increase Thaler et al. (1997) find 
when subjects are shown yearly ongoing returns rather than monthly ongoing returns.
16 We can 
reject at the 95% confidence level the hypothesis that the increase is more than 3.7 percentage 
points, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that being sent e-mails biannually instead of weekly 
decreases equity shares by as much as 2.5 percentage points. 
  We also find that telling subjects that they would see ongoing returns consolidated at the 
portfolio level rather than separately by each asset decreases equity investment by a statistically 
significant 5.0 percentage points. Recall that Anagol and Gamble (2009) find that a similar 
manipulation significantly increases portfolio risk-taking. The fact that we estimate a significant 
result in the opposite direction indicates that a lack of statistical power does not explain our 
failure to identify a positive effect of portfolio-level return aggregation on risk-taking. 
The second column of Table 7 adds interactions between the treatment dummies and a 
dummy variable for rejecting the equal chance of winning $8 or losing $5. Subjects who rejected 
this small 50-50 gamble have demonstrated that they are particularly loss averse and prone to 
narrow mental accounting, so they may be more susceptible to aggregation manipulations. The 
point estimate of the biannual e-mail treatment effect is 2.3 percentage points higher among 
gamble rejecters than gamble accepters, but this difference is not significant. The overall 
biannual e-mail effect among gamble rejecters, –0.4 + 2.3 = 1.9 percentage points, is not 
significantly different from zero. Gamble rejecters respond 0.7 percentage points more 
negatively to portfolio-level return reporting than gamble accepters—in the opposite direction of 
the motivating hypothesis that gamble rejecters would be most prone to increase risk-taking in 
response to return aggregation—but this difference too is not significant.
17 
                                                 
16 It is difficult to compare our treatment effect magnitudes with those of Gneezy and Potters (1997), Gneezy, 
Kapteyn, and Potters (2003), Bellemare et al. (2005), Haigh and List (2006), and van der Heijden et al. (2011), since 
they only offer subjects assets with binary payoffs. 
17 We have also checked to see if there is an interaction between the ongoing returns reporting treatment effects on 
initial equity shares and various sophistication measures: being more than 45 years old, having a bachelor’s degree, 
having an annual income above $75,000, having over $75,000 in financial assets, having over 25% of one’s non-
experimental financial assets invested in stocks, answering the compound interest question correctly, answering the 
diversification question correctly, answering the asset return volatility question correctly, and believing that the 
stock market follows a random walk. The only interaction significant at the 5% level is between having a bachelor’s 
degree and the ongoing returns e-mail frequency; the more educated increase their equity share by 7.3 percentage 16 
  The subjects in Gneezy and Potters (1997), Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003), 
Bellemare et al. (2005), and Haigh and List (2006) did not need to first experience disaggregated 
ongoing return disclosure before reducing their portfolio risk. Instead, they reduced their demand 
for risky assets starting in the very first period of the experiments, indicating that they 
prospectively anticipated the disutility from disaggregated ongoing return disclosure.
18 It is 
nevertheless possible that our subjects initially did not realize how disaggregated ongoing return 
disclosure would affect their utility, but they gradually learned as they became exposed to these 
risks. This would lead to a relative decrease in the disaggregated groups’ portfolio risk as the 
experiment progressed. 
  We test for the gradual emergence of a positive aggregation effect on risk-taking by using 
the equity share halfway into the experimental period as the dependent variable in the third and 
fourth columns of Table 7, and equity share at the end of the experiment as the dependent 
variable in the fifth and sixth columns. Like in Table 5, equity share at the halfway point is 
measured eight days after subjects receiving weekly e-mails got their 26th e-mailed returns-
checking link, and eight days after subjects receiving biannual e-mails got their first returns-
checking link. 
  The coefficient estimates in the third and fifth columns indicate that throughout the 
investment period, reporting ongoing returns on an aggregated basis did not significantly 
increase portfolio risk-taking. The point estimate of the biannual e-mail treatment effect actually 
shrinks slightly to 0.5 percentage points at the halfway point, and it flips sign to –1.4 percentage 
points at the end of the experiment. The portfolio-level return reporting treatment effect also 
attenuates to an insignificant –2.8 percentage points at the halfway point and an insignificant  
–3.8 percentage points at the end of the experiment. The fourth and sixth columns show that 
none of the treatment interactions with the dummy for turning down the small gamble are 
significant at the halfway point or at the end of the experiment. 
                                                                                                                                                           
points more than the less educated when e-mails are sent biannually instead of weekly, resulting in an overall 
treatment effect of 3.8 percentage points for the more educated that is significantly different from zero at the 10% 
level. However, this interaction attenuates to 3.6 percentage points and is no longer significant (t = 0.83) halfway 
through the investment period, and the overall treatment effect at six months for the more educated is 1.8 percentage 
points and insignificant (t = 0.64). 
18 It is not possible to make a similar judgment about the subjects in Thaler et al. (1997) and Anagol and Gamble 
(2009). Thaler et al. (1997) do not tell the subjects the return distributions of the experimental assets; subjects need 
to play numerous rounds in order to estimate these distributions themselves. Anagol and Gamble (2009) make 
subjects play practice rounds before starting data collection, and they do not report the choices in the practice 
rounds. 17 
  Could our null effects be driven by some subjects believing that the expected return of 
equities is negative due to the market’s drop prior to the start of the experiment? The same logic 
that causes some gambles with positive expected returns to appear more attractive under 
aggregation causes some gambles with negative expected returns to appear less attractive under 
aggregation. 
The fact that our subjects initially allocated an average of 65.7% of their portfolio to 
equities suggests that they did not in fact believe that the expected return on equities was 
negative. We further test this story by running regressions (not shown in the tables) of initial 
equity share on the treatment dummies and their interactions with a dummy for a subject 
believing in market momentum. We classify a subject as believing in market momentum if he 
believes that a 10% increase in the market in one month should increase one’s forecast of the 
market’s return next month and that a 10% decrease in the market in one month should decrease 
one’s forecast of the market’s return next month (see Table 4). Contrary to the hypothesis that 
our treatment effects are attenuated by the market drop prior to the experiment, we find no 
significantly positive aggregation treatment effects among those who do not believe in market 
momentum (and thus were unlikely to forecast a negative equity premium due to the pre-
experiment market decline). In addition, the treatment interactions with the momentum belief 
dummy are not significant. 
 
D. Effect of historical returns presentation on equity shares 
  Table 8 reports the results of regressions estimating the effect that the historical returns 
graphs had on the portfolio fraction invested in equities. We see in the first column that simply 
viewing any historical returns graph significantly raises the initial equity share by 11 to 12 
percentage points relative to not viewing a historical returns graph. However, it does not appear 
to matter whether the distributions of one-year returns or five-year annualized returns are 
presented. In fact—contrary to the increases in equity allocations ranging from 19 to 41 
percentage points found by Benartzi and Thaler (1999) when their subjects were shown 
simulated 30-year return distributions rather than one-year return distributions—our subjects 
who saw the five-year returns initially allocated less to equities than subjects who saw the one-18 
year graph, although the difference is not statistically significant.
19 Nor does it seem to matter 
whether subjects were able to see the return distributions of any mix of asset classes instead of 
only portfolios invested entirely in a single asset class. Being able to see the mixed asset class 
distributions is actually associated with a slightly lower initial allocation to equities, although the 
–0.4 percentage point effect is small and not significant. 
The second column shows that there are no significant interactions of the graph-viewing 
effects with whether the subject turned down the win $8/lose $5 gamble. Gamble accepters who 
saw the five-year graphs initially allocated a statistically insignificant 13.9 – 10.2 = 3.7 
percentage points less to equities than gamble accepters who saw the one-year graph. Gamble 
rejecters who saw the five-year graphs initially allocated a statistically insignificant 10.2 + 2.2 – 
(13.9 – 3.1) = 1.6 percentage points more to equities than gamble accepters who saw the one-
year graph. 
  These results do not change when we study asset allocation at the mid-point or at the end 
of the experiment. The last four columns of Table 8 report regressions in which the dependent 
variable is total equity share 27 weeks into experimental participation or at the end of the 
experiment. Although simply having seen historical returns graphs continued to raise equity 
share by about 9 percentage points through the remainder of the experiment, it again does not 
matter whether one-year or five-year return distributions were shown. Those seeing five-year 
graphs held 0.9 percentage points more in equities than those seeing one-year graphs at the 
halfway mark, and 1.5 percentage points less at the end of the experiment, but the differences are 
not significant. Splitting the sample between small gamble accepters and rejecters reveals no 
significant treatment effect differences between those who are more or less prone to myopic loss 
aversion. 
  Who is most affected by seeing the returns graphs? Table 9 shows estimates of graph 
treatment effect interactions with nine subject characteristics associated with greater financial 
sophistication: being more than 45 years old, having a bachelor’s degree, having an annual 
income above $75,000, having over $75,000 in financial assets, having over 25% of one’s non-
experimental financial assets invested in stocks, answering the compound interest question 
                                                 
19 Although using simulated 30-year returns in the long-horizon condition, as Benartzi and Thaler (1999) did, 
produces a stark contrast against one-year returns, simulated returns are difficult to explain to ordinary investors and 
are thus less likely to be employed in a real-world educational intervention. Reasonable five-year distributions can 
be computed from our 37-year historical sample period without resorting to simulation.  19 
correctly, answering the diversification question correctly, answering the asset return volatility 
question correctly, and believing that the stock market follows a random walk. Almost all of the 
interactions are negative as expected, indicating that the graphs had a smaller effect on initial 
equity allocations among the more sophisticated. However, only the interactions with having a 
bachelor’s degree are consistently significant. Those without a bachelor’s degree increased their 
initial equity share by 17 or 18 percentage points when they saw the graphs. Those with a 
bachelor’s degree increase their initial equity share by only 7 or 8 percentage points. We also see 
in the first column that subjects older than 45 react significantly less to the five-year graph. The 
age interaction with the one-year graph treatment effect is negative as well, but not significantly 
different from zero. (On the other hand, it is not statistically distinguishable from the age 
interaction with the 5-year graph treatment either.)
20  
  Table 10 shows how the graphs affected subjects’ confidence in their investment 
decisions. The coefficients are from ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables are 
subjects’ self-reported confidence in their investment decision, likelihood of changing their 
decision if they consulted with a professional investment advisor, and investment knowledge.
21 
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2010) find that answers to these questions are correlated with 
higher-quality portfolio choices in the form of people choosing lower-fee S&P 500 index funds. 
The point estimates indicate that the graphs made subjects more confident in their decision, less 
likely to change their decision if they consulted with a professional advisor, and more 
knowledgeable as investors. However, the only statistically significant coefficient is the effect of 
the one-year graph on confidence in the investment decision. 
 
E. Effects on trading frequency 
  In this subsection, we examine whether the aggregation treatments affected the tendency 
to trade during the one-year course of the experiment. The median number of days on which a 
subject made a reallocation is 2, and the average is 4.6. 
                                                 
20 Subjects cannot allocate more than 100% to equities, and when no graphs are shown, more sophisticated subjects 
tend to allocate more to equities than unsophisticated subjects. One might thus suspect that the negative interactions 
are driven by the fact that the sophisticated have less room to increase their equity share in response to the graphs. 
However, the results are similar when estimated using a tobit with left-censoring at 0% and right-censoring at 100%. 
21 See Table 4 for the exact wording of the questions used to elicit subjects’ confidence and the distribution of 
answers to the questions. 20 
We use the total number days on which a subject made a reallocation as the dependent 
variable in Table 11. In the first column, we control for all the treatment dummies. We find that 
subjects who were sent biannual e-mails to check their returns traded 4.3 fewer times than those 
who were sent weekly e-mails, a difference that is significant at the 1% level. Much of this effect 
is probably due to the fact that clicking on the e-mailed link is a convenient way to access the 
website, so the (already small) effort costs of entering a trade order are reduced for those who 
receive this link every week. However, simply seeing one’s return may also stimulate trading. 
Evidence for this mechanism comes from the fact that holding the number of e-mail links sent 
constant, seeing the ongoing returns of each individual asset rather than overall portfolio returns 
causes subjects to trade an additional 2.0 times, a difference that is also significant at the 1% 
level. 
  Recall that 80% of subjects had access to the historical returns graphs on the screen in 
which they entered trade orders. Although these graphs had a large effect on initial equity shares 
(Table 8), the regression in the first column of Table 11 shows that they did not significantly 
affect trading frequency over the course of the experiment. 
In the second column of Table 11, we add controls for a dummy for turning down the win 
$8/lose $5 gamble and an additional variable measuring subjects’ one-week discount rate. The 
discount rate was elicited by asking subjects a series of questions of the following form, where X 
took on values of $10.10, $11, $12, $13, $14, and $15:  
Suppose an absolutely trustworthy person offered to give you either $10 today or 
$X in one week. Assume it’s no more work for you to receive the money now 
versus later. Which would you prefer? 
These questions, which we asked immediately following the initial portfolio allocation, were 
hypothetical: responses did not affect subjects’ payments. We compute a subject’s discount rate 
as the maximum weekly interest rate at which the subject chooses the earlier payment.
22 Barberis 
and Xiong (2009) predict that loss-averse mental accounters who derive direct utility from 
realizing gains and losses will be less likely to trade when they hold paper losses. Barberis and 
Xiong (2010) predict that mental accounters who are especially impatient will be less likely to 
trade when they hold paper losses because they gain the most from deferring the jolt of negative 
utility that comes from realizing a loss. At the end of our experiment, 95% of our subjects had 
                                                 
22 If the subject always chooses the later payment, we code her discount rate as 0%. The maximum possible discount 
rate is 50%. 21 
portfolio values less than their initial $325 balance due to the bear market. The second column of 
Table 11 shows no significant evidence that especially myopically loss-averse, impatient subjects 
traded less frequently in a time period when most asset classes experienced large declines. 
 
III. Conclusion 
Many financial behaviors are difficult to explain unless loss aversion and/or mental 
accounting are important determinants of economic choices. Such behaviors include aversion to 
small-stakes risks with positive expected values (Rabin, 2000; Rabin and Thaler, 2001), the 
tendency to sell stocks with paper gains and hold stocks with paper losses (Shefrin and Statman, 
1985; Odean, 1998), and the failure to consider the asset allocation of non-salient accounts when 
making allocation decisions in a salient account (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2009). Myopic 
loss aversion has also been proposed as a resolution of the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1995; Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001; Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2006). 
The importance of myopic loss aversion raises the possibility that the boundaries of 
investors’ mental accounts could be manipulated by changes in information disclosure in order to 
increase risky asset demand. The experimental evidence to date has found that indeed, reporting 
only aggregated outcomes of multiple gambles increases subjects’ willingness to take financial 
risks. However, because these previous experiments were not primarily concerned with studying 
the effects of information disclosure by financial institutions on portfolio allocations, they 
abstracted away from certain features of the typical investment environment that may moderate 
such effects. In particular, previous experiments have all taken place within a single session and 
have used laboratory assets. In order to gauge the impact of disclosure policy, our experiment 
had subjects invest in real financial assets over the course of an entire year. We find that 
disclosing returns at a more aggregated level does not increase portfolio risk-taking. 
Although our results are surprising given some of the previous myopic loss aversion 
literature, they are consonant with another portion. Models that explain the equity premium with 
loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995; Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001) find that investors 
must evaluate (and receive prospect theoretic utility from) returns only once a year in order to 
quantitatively match historical average equity returns. Because the typical investor probably sees 
stock market returns more frequently than once a year, these theoretical results suggest that 
simply seeing returns does not cause investors to evaluate them. In the models of Barberis and 22 
Xiong (2009, 2010) that explain the disposition effect, investors receive prospect theoretic utility 
from returns only when they sell a security. Our results provide new evidence on when investors 
receive (or more specifically, do not receive) prospect theoretic utility from their financial assets 
that is more consistent with these models. 
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This table reports the number of subjects that were assigned to each experimental cell. 
Panel A contains cells where ongoing returns were reported only at the aggregated 
portfolio level. Panel B contains cells where ongoing returns were reported separately by 
each asset held by the subject. 
Panel A: Ongoing returns reported at portfolio level 
  Return viewing inducement frequency 
Historical return graph shown  Weekly  Biannual 
None 60  60 
1-year returns, single asset classes  30  30 
5-year returns, single asset classes  29  30 
1-year returns, portfolio mixes allowed 30  30 
5-year returns, portfolio mixes allowed 30  30 
Panel B: Ongoing returns reported separately by asset 
  Return viewing inducement frequency 
Historical return graph shown  Weekly  Biannual 
1-year returns, single asset classes  30  29 
5-year returns, single asset classes  30  30 
1-year returns, portfolio mixes allowed 30  30 
5-year returns, portfolio mixes allowed 30  29 
 
 
Table 2. Sample Divisions for Experimental Comparisons 
  Proportion of sample 
How often are subjects induced to get feedback about their 
own ongoing returns? 
 
   Weekly  50% 
   Biannually  50% 
How granular is subjects’ feedback about their own ongoing 
returns? 
 
   Each asset’s return reported separately  40% 
   Only aggregated portfolio-level returns reported  60% 
Are historical returns graphs available?   
   No historical returns graphs  20% 
   Historical returns graphs available  80% 
How are historical returns data aggregated across time in the 
graphs? 
 
   1-year return distributions shown  40% 
   5-year annualized return distributions shown  40% 
How are historical returns data aggregated across asset classes 
in the graphs? 
 
   Return distributions of single asset classes only are shown  40% 
   Return distributions of mixes of asset classes are shown  40% Table 3. Subject Characteristics 
 
Percent male  56%  Financial assets in bank,   
    brokerage, and retirement   
Age   accounts   
≤ 25  2%  < $25,000  27% 
26-35  31%  $25,001 - $50,000  13% 
36-45  22%  $50,001 - $75,000  10% 
46-55  19%  $75,001 - $100,000  9% 
55-65 13%  >  $100,000  29% 
≥ 66  13%  Prefer not to answer  12% 
      
Education    Percent of outside financial    
Some high school  1%  assets invested in stocks at   
High school graduate  10%  beginning of experiment   
Some college  23%  0%  20% 
Associate’s degree  10%  1 - 25%  32% 
Bachelor’s degree  28%  26 - 50%  17% 
Some graduate school  7%  51 - 75%  15% 
Graduate degree  21%  76 - 100%  8% 
    Prefer not to answer  9% 
Annual household income       
< $35,000  5%     
$35,000 - $50,000  21%     
$50,001 - $75,000  29%     
$75,001 - $100,000  19%     
> $100,000  21%     
Prefer not to answer  5%     
 Table 4. Subjects’ Financial Literacy 
 
How knowledgeable an investor do you  Buying a single company’s stock usually 
consider yourself to be?  provides a safer return than a stock 
Very knowledgeable  2%  mutual fund.   
Relatively knowledgeable  17%  True  5% 
Somewhat knowledgeable  44%  False  91% 
Less than knowledgeable  28%  No response  4% 
Not at all knowledgeable  9%     
    Normally, which asset’s returns fluctuate 
How confident are you that the decision  the most over time? 
you made is the right one for you?  Bonds  3% 
Very confident  7%  Stocks  87% 
Relatively confident  39%  Savings accounts  5% 
Somewhat confident  40%  All three about the same  5% 
Less than confident  12%  No response  0% 
Not at all confident  2%     
    Suppose during the month of January 
How likely is it that you would change  2010, the stock market rises by 10%. 
your portfolio decision if you consulted  What do you believe this tells you about 
a professional investment advisor?  the stock market’s return during February  
Very likely  17%  2010? 
Somewhat likely  66%  Increases return prediction  32% 
Not likely  17%  Return prediction unchanged  55% 
   Decreases  return  prediction  10% 
Suppose you had $100 in a savings  No response  2% 
account, and the interest rate was 2%      
per year. After 5 years, how much do  Suppose during the month of January 
you think you would have in the account   2010, the stock market falls by 10%. What
if you left the money to grow?  do you believe this tells you about the  
More than $102  90%  stock market’s return during February 
Exactly $102  7%  2010? 
Less than $102  3%  Increases return prediction  12% 
No response  0%  Return prediction unchanged  55% 
   Decreases  return  prediction  31% 
   No  response  2% 
      
Note: The percentages for the compound interest, single stock versus mutual fund risk, asset volatility, and 
stock market momentum questions exclude from their denominator 28 subjects who did not respond to the 
exit questionnaire. 
 
  Table 5. Portfolio Allocations 
This table shows the average portfolio allocation and average number of funds held by 
subjects at the start of the experiment, 27 weeks into experimental participation, and at 
the end of the experiment. 
 
  Initial allocation 27 weeks  Final allocation 
Money market  15.8%  20.6%  20.0% 
Bonds 18.6%  22.2%  20.6% 
U.S. equities  30.9%  29.3%  31.2% 
International equities  34.8%  27.9%  28.2% 
Total equities  
(U.S. + international) 
65.7% 57.2%  59.4% 





Table 6. Website Visits After Initial Allocation 
This table shows, by return viewing inducement frequency, the average number of total 
visits to the study website per subject, the average total viewings of the returns screens 
per subject, and the average fraction of the available returns screens that were viewed by 
each subject. “Total visits to the website” include visits that involved viewing a returns 
screen. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
  Return viewing inducement frequency  p-value of 
difference    Weekly  Biannual 
Total visits to website  60.7  18.2  0.000 
  (2.6) (1.9)   
Viewings of returns   45.3  1.5  0.000 
   screens from e-mail links  (0.7) (0.0)   
Fraction of possible e-mail link    87.2%  73.8%  0.000 
   returns screens viewed   (1.9)  (2.5)   
 
  Table 7. Ongoing Return Presentation Effects on Equity Allocations 
The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities at the start of 
the experiment, 27 weeks into experimental participation, and at the end of the 
experiment. Biannual e-mail is a dummy for whether the subject was sent an e-mail with 
a link to his ongoing returns biannually. Portfolio-level return reporting is a dummy for 
whether the subject’s ongoing returns were reported only at the consolidated portfolio 
level. Loss averse is a dummy for whether the subject turned down the win $8/lose $5 
gamble we offered. Point estimates from an OLS regression are shown, with standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
  Initial allocation  27 weeks  Final allocation 
Biannual e-mail  0.6 -0.4  0.5 -2.9 -1.4 -3.5 
 (1.6)  (2.2)  (2.1)  (3.0) (2.2) (3.0) 
Portfolio-level return  -5.0** -4.7* -2.8  -4.4  -3.8  -4.9 
reporting  (1.7) (2.3) (2.2) (3.0) (2.2) (3.1) 
Loss averse   -2.2  -7.7  -5.3 
   (3.0)   (4.0)   (4.1) 
Biannual  viewing  ×   2.3   7.1   4.3 
Loss averse   (3.3)   (4.3)   (4.4) 
Portfolio-level return   -0.7   2.9   2.0 
reporting × Loss averse   (3.3)   (4.4)   (4.5) 
Constant  68.6** 69.7** 53.4** 57.2** 62.4** 65.0** 
  (1.5) (2.1) (2.0) (2.8) (2.0)  2.9 
Sample  size  597 597 597 597 597 597 
* Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. 
 Table 8. Historical Return Graph Effect on Equity Allocations 
The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities at the start of 
the experiment, 27 weeks into the experiment, and at the end of the experiment. 1-year 
graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with one-year historical 
returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with five-
year historical returns. Asset class mixes shown is a dummy for whether the subject saw a 
historical returns graphing tool that could show distributions of arbitrary asset class 
mixes. Loss averse is a dummy for whether the subject turned down the win $8/lose $5 
gamble we offered. Point estimates from an OLS regression are shown, with standard 
errors in parentheses. 
 
  Initial allocation  27 weeks  Final allocation 
1-year graph  12.2** 13.9**  8.5**  9.3*  9.6** 11.1* 
  (2.4) (3.3) (3.2) (4.5) (3.2) (4.5) 
5-year graph  11.1** 10.2**  9.4**  7.9  8.1*  7.5 
  (2.4) (3.3) (3.1) (4.4) (3.2) (4.5) 
Asset class mixes shown  -0.4 -1.9  1.2 -2.5 -1.0 -5.3 
  (1.8) (2.5) (2.4) (3.3) (2.4) (3.4) 
Loss averse   -2.3  -6.2  -5.3 
   (3.6)   (4.8)  (4.8) 
1-year graph × Loss averse   -3.1  -1.1  -2.4 
   (4.7)   (6.3)  (6.4) 
5-year graph × Loss averse   2.2   3.4  1.8 
   (4.7)   (6.3)  (6.4) 
Asset class mixes shown   2.7   7.5  8.6 
× Loss averse   (3.6)   (4.8)  (4.9) 
Constant  56.8** 57.9** 44.4** 47.4** 52.7** 55.2** 
  (1.8) (2.5) (2.4) (3.3) (2.4) (3.4) 
Sample  size  597 597 597 597 597 597 
* Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. Table 9. Historical Return Graph Effect on Initial Equity Allocation  
Interacted with Subject Sophistication 
The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities at the start of the experiment. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether 
the subject was shown graphs with one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with five-
year historical returns. The definition of the sophistication dummy varies by column: being older than 45, having at least a bachelor’s degree, 
having an annual income above $75,000, having financial assets in excess of $75,000, allocating more than 25% of one’s (non-experimental) 
financial assets to stocks, correctly answering the compound interest question, correctly answering that a single company’s stock is riskier 
than a stock mutual fund, correctly answering that stocks are more volatile than bonds or savings accounts, and answering that neither a 10% 
increase nor a 10% decrease in the stock market in a given month predicts the next month’s stock market return. Point estimates from an OLS 
regression are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
























1-year graph  14.2** 18.0** 12.4**  12.7**  12.5**  14.8*  3.9  14.5*  9.0** 
  (2.9)  (3.4)  (2.8)  (2.8)  (2.7) (7.1) (6.9) (6.3)  (3.2) 
5-year graph  15.9** 16.9** 12.9**  13.5**  11.9**  19.9**  5.0  15.4*  11.5** 
  (2.9)  (3.4)  (2.8)  (2.7)  (2.7) (7.3) (7.2) (6.5)  (3.1) 
1-year graph ×   -5.2 -9.6*  -1.0  -2.4  -2.7 -2.9  9.1 -2.7 6.0 
Soph.  dummy  (4.4)  (4.4)  (4.4)  (4.4)  (4.4) (7.4) (7.3) (6.7)  (4.5) 
5-year graph ×   -11.5** -9.6*  -4.8  -6.7  -3.6 -9.8  6.6 -4.9  -0.8 
Soph.  dummy  (4.4)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.5)  (4.4) (7.7) (7.6) (6.9)  (4.5) 
Sophistication   4.5  11.8**  5.6  9.2*  11.5**  9.0  -2.9  6.7  2.0 
dummy  (3.6)  (3.6)  (3.6)  (3.6)  (3.6) (6.2) (5.8) (5.6)  (3.7) 
Constant  54.9**  49.6**  54.5**  53.3**  52.6** 48.5** 59.1** 50.6**  55.5** 
  (2.3)  (2.8)  (2.3)  (2.2)  (2.2) (5.9) (5.4) (5.3)  (2.6) 
Sample size  597  597  597  597  597  569  569  569  569 
* Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. Table 10. Historical Return Graph Effect on Investment Confidence 
The dependent variables are subjects’ self-reported confidence that the investment 
decision they made was right for them, likelihood that they would change their portfolio 
decision if they consulted a professional investment advisor, and investment knowledge. 
The table shows coefficients from an ordered probit regression, with standard errors in 
parentheses. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with 
one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown 
graphs with five-year historical returns. Thresholds 1 through 4 are the boundaries 
between categories estimated by the ordered probit.  
 






1-year graph  0.278* -0.207  0.218 
  (0.119) (0.129)  (0.119) 
5-year graph  0.170 -0.149 0.115 
  (0.119) (0.129)  (0.119) 
      
Threshold 1  -1.958**  -1.109**  -1.220** 
  (0.151) (0.114)  (0.111) 
Threshold 2  -0.912**  0.811**  -0.212* 
  (0.106) (0.110)  (0.101) 
Threshold 3  0.283**    1.017** 
  (0.101)   (0.106) 
Threshold 4  1.635**    2.191** 
  (0.118)   (0.148) 
Sample  size  597 597 597 
* Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. 
 
 Table 11. Determinants of Trading Frequency 
The dependent variable is the total number of days on which a portfolio reallocation was 
executed for a subject. Biannual e-mail is a dummy for whether the subject was sent an e-
mail with a link to his ongoing returns biannually. Portfolio-level return reporting is a 
dummy for whether the subject’s ongoing returns were reported only at the consolidated 
portfolio level. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with 
one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown 
graphs with five-year historical returns. Asset class mixes shown is a dummy for whether 
the historical returns graphing tool could show distributions of arbitrary asset class mixes. 
Loss averse is a dummy for whether the subject turned down the win $8/lose $5 gamble 
we offered. Discount rate is the maximum weekly interest rate at which the subject 
chooses the hypothetical earlier payment. 
 
Biannual e-mail  -4.35** -4.35** 
 (0.55)  (0.55) 
Portfolio-level return  -1.99** -2.00** 
reporting  (0.62) (0.62) 
1-year graph  -0.05 -0.06 
 (0.87)  (0.87) 
5-year graph  0.17 0.17 
 (0.87)  (0.87) 
Asset class mixes shown  -0.88 -0.86 
  (0.62) (0.62) 
Loss averse   0.22 
   (0.56) 
Discount rate   0.08 
   (1.87) 
Constant 8.31**  8.20** 
 (0.91)  (0.96) 
Sample size  597  597 
* Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. 







































































































































































































































Active subjects S&P 500Figure 2. Initial Screen in Condition with Biannual Viewing of 
Asset by Asset Ongoing Returns and  
Single Asset Class Five-Year Historical Return Graphs 
 Figure 3. Historical Returns Graphing Tool that Shows One-Year Returns of  
Single Asset Classes Only 
 
 Figure 4. Historical Returns Graphing Tool that Shows Five-Year Annualized 




 Figure 5. Initial Portfolio Allocation Screen in Condition with Biannual Viewing of 
Asset by Asset Ongoing Returns  
and Single Asset Class Five-Year Historical Return Graphs 
 Figure 6. Portfolio Status Page 
 
 Figure 7. Recent Returns Screen in Conditions with  




















Figure 8. Recent Return Screen in Conditions  
with Weekly Viewing of Ongoing Overall Portfolio Returns  Figure 9. Portfolio Reallocation Screen in Conditions with Historical Returns 
Graphing Tool that Shows One-Year Returns of Arbitrary Portfolio Mixes 
 